Journal Article

‘A Succession of Feelings, in and of Itself, is Not a Feeling of Succession’

Christoph Hoerl

in Mind

Published on behalf of Mind Association

Volume 122, issue 486, pages 373-417
Published in print April 2013 | ISSN: 0026-4423
Published online September 2013 | e-ISSN: 1460-2113 | DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzt070
‘A Succession of Feelings, in and of Itself, is Not a Feeling of Succession’

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Variants of the slogan that a succession of experiences (in and of itself) does not amount to an experience of succession are commonplace in the philosophical literature on temporal experience. I distinguish three quite different arguments that might be captured using this slogan: the individuation argument, the unity argument, and the causal argument. Versions of the unity and the causal argument are often invoked in support of a particular view of the nature of temporal experience sometimes called intentionalism, and against a rival view sometimes called extensionalism. I examine these arguments in light of the individuation argument. In particular, I show that the individuation argument is, at least prima facie, neutral between those two views of temporal experience; and once the individuation argument is in place, the unity and causal argument also lose their force against extensionalism.

Journal Article.  20208 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics ; Epistemology ; Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic ; Philosophy of Mind ; Philosophy of Language

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