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Law x Game Theory and Bargaining Theory x clear all

A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings

Thomas J. Miceli and Kathleen Segerson.

in American Law and Economics Review

January 2007; p ublished online June 2007 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Property Law; Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics; Regional Government Analysis. 4870 words.

The holdout problem is commonly cited as the justification for eminent domain, but the nature of the problem is not well understood. This article models the holdout problem in a bargaining...

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Does Court Speed Shape Economic Activity? Evidence from a Court Reform in India

Matthieu Chemin.

in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

August 2012; p ublished online November 2010 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance; Economic Development; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Production and Organizations; Law and Economics; Contract Law. 11445 words.

This article investigates the impact of quick courts on firms' contracting behavior and economic performance. In 2002, the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act was enacted in India to...

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Expectation Damages and Bilateral Cooperative Investments

Daniel Göller.

in American Law and Economics Review

December 2014; p ublished online April 2014 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Contract Law; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainy; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance; Particular Labour Markets. 8898 words.

We examine the efficiency of the standard breach remedy expectation damages in a setting where the buyer invests cooperatively and the seller invests both cooperatively and selfishly....

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First-Purchase Rights: Rights of First Refusal and Rights of First Offer

Marcel Kahan, Shmuel Leshem and Rangarajan K. Sundaram.

in American Law and Economics Review

December 2012; p ublished online October 2012 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Contract Law. 12980 words.

This paper analyzes rights of first refusal and rights of first offer in a multiple-buyer, sequential bargaining setting. A right of first refusal entitles the right-holder to purchase a...

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On and Off Contract Remedies Inducing Cooperative Investments

Richard R.W. Brooks and Alexander Stremitzer.

in American Law and Economics Review

December 2012; p ublished online October 2012 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Particular Labour Markets; Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behaviour; Contract Law. 7546 words.

A party dissatisfied with the contractual performance of a counterparty is typically able to pursue a variety of legal recourses. Within this apparent variety are two fundamental...

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Partnership dissolution, complementarity, and investment incentives

Jianpei Li and Elmar Wolfstetter.

in Oxford Economic Papers

July 2010; p ublished online September 2009 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behaviour; Demographic Economics; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainy; Contract Law. 7984 words.

Partnerships form in order to take advantage of complementary skills; however, new opportunities may arise that make some partners' skills useless. We analyse partnerships that anticipate...

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WHEN IS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEEDED AS A CARROT FOR INNOVATORS?

Christoph Engel.

in Journal of Competition Law & Economics

June 2011; p ublished online March 2011 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Technological Change; Research and Development; Property Law; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. 7570 words.

Policymakers all over the world claim that there can be no innovation without protection. For more than a century, critics have objected that the case for intellectual property is far from...

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