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Contract Law x Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behaviour x clear all

On and Off Contract Remedies Inducing Cooperative Investments

Richard R.W. Brooks and Alexander Stremitzer.

in American Law and Economics Review

December 2012; p ublished online October 2012 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Particular Labour Markets; Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behaviour; Contract Law. 7546 words.

A party dissatisfied with the contractual performance of a counterparty is typically able to pursue a variety of legal recourses. Within this apparent variety are two fundamental...

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Partnership dissolution, complementarity, and investment incentives

Jianpei Li and Elmar Wolfstetter.

in Oxford Economic Papers

July 2010; p ublished online September 2009 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behaviour; Demographic Economics; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainy; Contract Law. 7984 words.

Partnerships form in order to take advantage of complementary skills; however, new opportunities may arise that make some partners' skills useless. We analyse partnerships that anticipate...

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Producer Protection Legislation and Termination Damages in the Presence of Contracting Frictions

Steven Y. Wu.

in American Journal of Agricultural Economics

January 2010; p ublished online January 2010 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainy; Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behaviour; Contract Law. 8921 words.

This study models producer protection legislation (PPL) that would grant growers the right to claim damages if their contracts are prematurely terminated. In the absence of contracting...

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