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Business and Management x Game Theory and Bargaining Theory x clear all

Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany

Lammertjan Dam and Michael Koetter.

in The Review of Financial Studies

August 2012; p ublished online April 2012 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Banking; Financial Regulation; Regulation and Industrial Policy. 16089 words.

We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking industry lead to additional risk taking. To identify the moral hazard effect of bailout...

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Board Structures Around the World: an Experimental Investigation

Ann B. Gillette, Thomas H. Noe and Michael J. Rebello.

in Review of Finance

March 2008; p ublished online October 2007 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Mergers and Acquisitions; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. 18257 words.

We model and experimentally examine the board structure–performance relationship. We examine single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards, and outsider-controlled...

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Buying Shares and/or Votes for Corporate Control

Eddie Dekel and Asher Wolinsky.

in The Review of Economic Studies

January 2012; p ublished online November 2011 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Mergers and Acquisitions; Analysis of Collective Decision-making. 16933 words.

We explore how allowing votes to be traded separately of shares may affect the efficiency of corporate control contests. Our basic set-up and the nature of the questions continue the work...

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Consensus in Diverse Corporate Boards

Nina Baranchuk and Philip H. Dybvig.

in The Review of Financial Studies

February 2009; p ublished online May 2008 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Corporate Governance; Analysis of Collective Decision-making; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. 13504 words.

Many directors are not simply insiders or outsiders. For example, an officer of a supplier is neither independent nor captive of management. We use a spatial model of board decision-making...

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Does Court Speed Shape Economic Activity? Evidence from a Court Reform in India

Matthieu Chemin.

in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

August 2012; p ublished online November 2010 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance; Economic Development; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Production and Organizations; Law and Economics; Contract Law. 11445 words.

This article investigates the impact of quick courts on firms' contracting behavior and economic performance. In 2002, the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act was enacted in India to...

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Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Empirical Work*

Chaim Fershtman and Ariel Pakes.

in The Quarterly Journal of Economics

November 2012; p ublished online November 2012 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainy; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance. 18658 words.

We develop a framework for the analysis of dynamic oligopolies with persistant sources of asymmetric information that enables applied analysis of situations of empirical importance that...

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Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players

Matthew O. Jackson and Simon Wilkie.

in The Review of Economic Studies

April 2005; p ublished online April 2005 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance; Market Structure and Pricing. 14171 words.

We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes,...

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Expectation Damages and Bilateral Cooperative Investments

Daniel Göller.

in American Law and Economics Review

December 2014; p ublished online April 2014 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Contract Law; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainy; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance; Particular Labour Markets. 8898 words.

We examine the efficiency of the standard breach remedy expectation damages in a setting where the buyer invests cooperatively and the seller invests both cooperatively and selfishly....

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HOW LOYALTY DISCOUNTS CAN PERVERSELY DISCOURAGE DISCOUNTING

Einer Elhauge.

in Journal of Competition Law & Economics

June 2009; p ublished online March 2009 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Antitrust Issues and Policies; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance. 16851 words.

Loyalty discounts are agreements to sell at a lower price to buyers who buy all or most of their purchases from the seller. This article proves that loyalty discounts can create...

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Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics

Qingmin Liu.

in The Review of Economic Studies

October 2011; p ublished online February 2011 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainy; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance. 12145 words.

We study dynamic incentives and behaviour in markets with costly discovery of past transactions. In our model, a sequence of short-lived customers interact over time with a single...

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