Oxford Index Browse

You are looking at 1-10 of 17 items for:

Economics x Industry Studies x Game Theory and Bargaining Theory x clear all

Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany

Lammertjan Dam and Michael Koetter.

in The Review of Financial Studies

August 2012; p ublished online April 2012 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Banking; Financial Regulation; Regulation and Industrial Policy. 16089 words.

We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking industry lead to additional risk taking. To identify the moral hazard effect of bailout...

Go to Oxford Journals »  home page

Does Court Speed Shape Economic Activity? Evidence from a Court Reform in India

Matthieu Chemin.

in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

August 2012; p ublished online November 2010 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance; Economic Development; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Production and Organizations; Law and Economics; Contract Law. 11445 words.

This article investigates the impact of quick courts on firms' contracting behavior and economic performance. In 2002, the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act was enacted in India to...

Go to Oxford Journals »  home page

Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Empirical Work*

Chaim Fershtman and Ariel Pakes.

in The Quarterly Journal of Economics

November 2012; p ublished online November 2012 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainy; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance. 18658 words.

We develop a framework for the analysis of dynamic oligopolies with persistant sources of asymmetric information that enables applied analysis of situations of empirical importance that...

Go to Oxford Journals »  home page

Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players

Matthew O. Jackson and Simon Wilkie.

in The Review of Economic Studies

April 2005; p ublished online April 2005 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance; Market Structure and Pricing. 14171 words.

We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes,...

Go to Oxford Journals »  abstract

Expectation Damages and Bilateral Cooperative Investments

Daniel Göller.

in American Law and Economics Review

December 2014; p ublished online April 2014 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Contract Law; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainy; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance; Particular Labour Markets. 8898 words.

We examine the efficiency of the standard breach remedy expectation damages in a setting where the buyer invests cooperatively and the seller invests both cooperatively and selfishly....

Go to Oxford Journals »  home page

HOW LOYALTY DISCOUNTS CAN PERVERSELY DISCOURAGE DISCOUNTING

Einer Elhauge.

in Journal of Competition Law & Economics

June 2009; p ublished online March 2009 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Antitrust Issues and Policies; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance. 16851 words.

Loyalty discounts are agreements to sell at a lower price to buyers who buy all or most of their purchases from the seller. This article proves that loyalty discounts can create...

Go to Oxford Journals »  home page

Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics

Qingmin Liu.

in The Review of Economic Studies

October 2011; p ublished online February 2011 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainy; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance. 12145 words.

We study dynamic incentives and behaviour in markets with costly discovery of past transactions. In our model, a sequence of short-lived customers interact over time with a single...

Go to Oxford Journals »  abstract

New, Like New, or Very Good? Reputation and Credibility

Bruno Jullien and In-Uck Park.

in The Review of Economic Studies

October 2014; p ublished online April 2014 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainy; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance. 16037 words.

We show that sellers may earn a reputation for their “ability” to deliver high-quality goods on average by honestly announcing the realized quality of items for sale every period. As the...

Go to Oxford Journals »  home page

On and Off Contract Remedies Inducing Cooperative Investments

Richard R.W. Brooks and Alexander Stremitzer.

in American Law and Economics Review

December 2012; p ublished online October 2012 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Particular Labour Markets; Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behaviour; Contract Law. 7546 words.

A party dissatisfied with the contractual performance of a counterparty is typically able to pursue a variety of legal recourses. Within this apparent variety are two fundamental...

Go to Oxford Journals »  home page

On the Optimality of Multi-tier Hierarchies: Coordination versus Motivation

Chongwoo Choe and Shingo Ishiguro.

in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

August 2012; p ublished online November 2011 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behaviour; Production and Organizations. 12920 words.

We study internal organization of a firm that comprises a CEO and two division managers. The two key ingredients of our model are externalities among divisions' projects that may require...

Go to Oxford Journals »  home page