Oxford Index Browse

You are looking at 1-8 of 8 items for:

Econometrics and Mathematical Economics x Mergers and Acquisitions x clear all

Board Structures Around the World: an Experimental Investigation

Ann B. Gillette, Thomas H. Noe and Michael J. Rebello.

in Review of Finance

March 2008; p ublished online October 2007 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Mergers and Acquisitions; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. 18257 words.

We model and experimentally examine the board structure–performance relationship. We examine single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards, and outsider-controlled...

Go to Oxford Journals »  home page

Buying Shares and/or Votes for Corporate Control

Eddie Dekel and Asher Wolinsky.

in The Review of Economic Studies

January 2012; p ublished online November 2011 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Mergers and Acquisitions; Analysis of Collective Decision-making. 16933 words.

We explore how allowing votes to be traded separately of shares may affect the efficiency of corporate control contests. Our basic set-up and the nature of the questions continue the work...

Go to Oxford Journals »  abstract

MODELING THE DURATION OF MERGER REVIEWS IN NEW ZEALAND

Qing Gong Yang and Michael Pickford.

in Journal of Competition Law & Economics

March 2016; p ublished online January 2016 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Econometric Modelling; Analysis of Collective Decision-making; Mergers and Acquisitions; Antitrust Issues and Policies. 11324 words.

The limited evidence on the speed of processing merger reviews by competition agencies shows that the time taken varies widely between cases. In this article, we explore which factors...

Go to Oxford Journals »  home page

A note on merger and acquisition evaluation

Benjamin Furlan, Harald Oberhofer and Hannes Winner.

in Industrial and Corporate Change

June 2016; p ublished online June 2015 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Single Equation Models; Single Variables; Mergers and Acquisitions; Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behaviour. 4872 words.

This note proposes the continuous treatment approach as a valuable alternative to propensity score matching for evaluating economic effects of merger and acquisitions (M&As). This framework...

Go to Oxford Journals »  home page

A Reexamination of Corporate Governance and Equity Prices

Shane A. Johnson, Theodore C. Moorman and Sorin Sorescu.

in The Review of Financial Studies

November 2009; p ublished online April 2009 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General; Econometric Modelling; Economics; Mergers and Acquisitions. 14743 words.

We reexamine long-term abnormal returns for portfolios sorted on governance characteristics. Firms with strong shareholder rights and firms with weak shareholder rights differ from the...

Go to Oxford Journals »  home page

Symmetric and asymmetric effects of proximities. The case of M&A deals in Italy

Ron Boschma, Emanuela Marrocu and Raffaele Paci.

in Journal of Economic Geography

March 2016; p ublished online March 2015 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Mergers and Acquisitions; Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics; Single Equation Models; Single Variables. 14188 words.

This article investigates the effect of geographical, industrial, organizational and institutional proximity on the probability that any two firms located in Italy engage in a mergers and...

Go to Oxford Journals »  home page

THE USE OF SURVEYS IN MERGER AND COMPETITION ANALYSIS

Stephen Hurley.

in Journal of Competition Law & Economics

March 2011; p ublished online September 2010 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Mergers and Acquisitions; Econometric and Statistical Methods; Special Topics; Data Collection and Date Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs; Design of Experiments; Antitrust Issues and Policies. 11086 words.

Data generated from surveys have long been used to gather information from a large population efficiently. Used properly by competition authorities and professional advisors, surveys can...

Go to Oxford Journals »  home page

When Less Is More: The Benefits of Limits on Executive Pay

Peter Cebon and Benjamin E. Hermalin.

in The Review of Financial Studies

June 2015; p ublished online December 2014 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainy; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Mergers and Acquisitions; Wages, Compensation, and Labour Costs. 13834 words.

We derive conditions under which limits on executive compensation can enhance efficiency and benefit shareholders (but not executives). Having its hands tied in the future allows a board of...

Go to Oxford Journals »  abstract