The Epistemology of Silence

Sanford C. Goldberg

in Social Epistemology

Published in print November 2010 | ISBN: 9780199577477
Published online January 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191595189 | DOI:
The Epistemology of Silence

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Epistemic disagreement is disagreement over epistemic principles, or principles concerning the reliability and extent of our epistemic methods. This chapter argues that disagreement over this sort raises a new problem distinct from skepticism. Like some skeptical arguments, the problem of epistemic disagreement is rooted in part in the issue of epistemic circularity. But it is not a problem about whether we in fact have knowledge or are justified in our opinions. It is about rationally resolving explicit disagreement over the reliability of our most basic methods for forming beliefs. The bulk of this chapter is concerned with getting clear on the problem and its nature. Finally, the chapter sketches a solution.

Keywords: epistemic circularity; epistemic disagreement; justified belief; knowledge; rational resolution; reliability; skepticism

Chapter.  9648 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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