Chapter

Truth<sup>1</sup>

J. L. Austin, J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock

in Philosophical Papers

Third edition

Published in print March 1979 | ISBN: 9780192830210
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597039 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019283021X.003.0005

Series: Clarendon Paperbacks

Truth1

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Deals with the question of whether there is a use of ‘is true’ that is the primary or generic name for that which at bottom we are always saying ‘is true’. Austin discusses the views that truth is primarily a property of beliefs and of true statements. He goes on to argue that the word ‘true’ denotes the validity of an intended (or expected) correspondence between a representation and what it represents, and dismantles confusions about the meaning of the words that underlie such a view, such as ‘fact that’ and ‘corresponds’.

Keywords: Austin; belief; correspondence; fact; meaning; property; representation; statement; truth

Chapter.  6981 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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