Chapter

Mad Pain and Martian Pain

David Lewis

in Philosophical Papers Volume I

Published in print August 1983 | ISBN: 9780195032048
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833382 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195032047.003.0009
Mad Pain and Martian Pain

Show Summary Details

Preview

Lewis invites us to consider two ostensible challenges to any materialist theory of the mind. The madman feels pain just as we do, but his pain differs greatly from ours in its characteristic causes and effects; the Martian also feels pain just as we do, but his pain differs greatly from ours in its physical realization. Lewis argues that his functionalist theory is adequate to meet the challenges presented by both cases. In the postscript, Lewis considers how advocates of phenomenal qualia respond to the functionalist account he defends; in particular, he responds to Frank Jackson's ‘knowledge argument’.

Keywords: Armstrong; functionalism; Frank Jackson; materialism; pain; phenomenal; qualia; type‐identity

Chapter.  5207 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.