Attitudes De Dicto and De Se

David Lewis

in Philosophical Papers Volume I

Published in print August 1983 | ISBN: 9780195032048
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833382 | DOI:
Attitudes De Dicto and De Se

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In this wide‐ranging paper, Lewis defends the view that propositional attitudes consist in relations to properties, which themselves are sets of possible individuals. In so doing, he champions the importance of self‐ascribing attitudes (i.e. what he coins ‘de se’ attitudes), arguing that “the de se subsumes the de dicto, but not vice versa.” Along the way, a host of topics are discussed, including time‐slices of continuant persons, centered possible worlds, and decision theory.

Keywords: centered possible worlds; de dicto; de re; de se; decision theory; haecceitism; indexical; David Kaplan; John Perry; propositional attitudes; Quine; Stalnaker

Chapter.  13657 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

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