In this chapter, Feinberg considers the concept of exploitation (which he defines as a way of using someone for one's own ends), distinguishing between exploitation that causes harm and exploitation that does not. On rare occasions, exploitation of a morally unsavory nature can occur although it is free‐floating and thus does not harm the interests of the exploitee. If this nongrievance exploitation were a moral evil, then the liberty‐limiting principle legitimizing its prohibition (the exploitative principle) would be a variety of strict legal moralism. Feinberg assesses this principle in...

In this chapter, Feinberg considers the concept of exploitation (which he defines as a way of using someone for one's own ends), distinguishing between exploitation that causes harm and exploitation that does not. On rare occasions, exploitation of a morally unsavory nature can occur although it is free‐floating and thus does not harm the interests of the exploitee. If this nongrievance exploitation were a moral evil, then the liberty‐limiting principle legitimizing its prohibition (the exploitative principle) would be a variety of strict legal moralism. Feinberg assesses this principle in Ch. 32. Here, he considers the key elements of exploitation: (1) the ways that other people can be used, (2) the kinds of potentially exploitable traits and circumstances, and (3) the redistribution of gains and loses.