Post‐Classical Chisholmian Internalism

Alvin Plantinga

in Warrant: The Current Debate

Published in print July 1993 | ISBN: 9780195078626
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833559 | DOI:
Post‐Classical Chisholmian Internalism

Show Summary Details


Some of Roderick Chisholm's more recent work has displayed a conception of warrant (which conception I refer to with the phrase “postclassical Chisholmian internalism”), which differs substantially from his earlier conception of warrant (classical Chisholmian internalism). In this chapter, I explain postclassical Chisholmian internalism and then offer four critical observations about it. First, it is relatively uninformative (telling us little about what warrant is); second, it remains internalist, but loses the principal philosophical motivation for internalism by moving away from deontology. Third, it is not the case (contrary to the postclassical Chisholm) that for a given belief B, there is a set S of evidence bases such that, necessarily, B has warrant for me if and only if it occurs in conjunction with a member of that set S. And, fourth, it is a mistake to suppose that the warrant a belief enjoys for S can be understood as a function solely of the psychological properties S exemplifies.

Keywords: Chisholm; deontology; evidence base; internalism; warrant

Chapter.  10961 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.