Fourth‐Clause Theories

Robert J. Fogelin

in Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification

Published in print December 1994 | ISBN: 9780195089875
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833238 | DOI:
Fourth‐Clause Theories

Show Summary Details


This chapter examines a series of attempts to produce an analysis of knowledge that avoids Gettier problems by adding some further restriction (fourth clause) to the doctrine that knowledge is justified true belief. The common feature in all Gettier examples is that S's claim to know that p is defeated by some fact he is not privy to (though not negligent in failing to check on it). To avoid such defeators, an indefeasibility clause is added to the standard definition. This produced a long series of new and more complex fourth clauses that were met with new, more exotic counterexamples. The chapter examines the contributions of Lehrer, Paxson, Swain, and Pappas in this endeavor.

Keywords: Gettier problems; indefeasibility; Lehrer; Pappas; Paxson; Swain

Chapter.  4240 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.