Chapter

Two Kinds of Intrinsic Goodness

Michael Slote

in From Morality to Virtue

Published in print August 1995 | ISBN: 9780195093926
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833689 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195093925.003.0012
Two Kinds of Intrinsic Goodness

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Two different kinds of intrinsic goodness are often conflated. A state of affairs can be intrinsically good (e.g. the virtuous being happy), but certain things can be intrinsically good for a person, a constitutive element in his or her welfare. These notions do not come together, as Kant's example of the prosperous but evil individual manifestly indicates: intuitively, such a state of affairs is in itself intrinsically bad but is nonetheless intrinsically good for, i.e. beneficial to, the prosperous individual. Any virtue ethics needs to keep these concepts distinct.

Keywords: beneficial; good for a person; good state of affairs; intrinsically good; virtue ethics

Chapter.  6369 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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