Chapter

Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals?

Alvin Plantinga

in Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality

Published in print May 2003 | ISBN: 9780195103762
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833573 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195103769.003.0004
Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals?

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The Theory of Worldbound Individuals (T.W.I.) is the view that each object exists in just one possible world. In this chapter, I argue that (a) there is no good reason to accept T.W.I. and (b) T.W.I. has implausible consequences. I begin by demonstrating that traditional arguments for T.W.I., including the Problem of Transworld Identification, are based on confusion and do not pose problems for the thesis that objects exist in more than one possible world. In the final section of the chapter, I argue that T.W.I. entails that every object has all of its properties essentially. Moreover, T.W.I. entails this even if it is fortified with David Lewis's Counterpart Theory.

Keywords: counterpart theory; essential; David Lewis; possible worlds; property; Transworld Identification; worldbound individuals

Chapter.  8760 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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