Replies to My Colleagues

Alvin Plantinga

in Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality

Published in print May 2003 | ISBN: 9780195103762
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833573 | DOI:
Replies to My Colleagues

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In this essay, I consider several objections raised by John Pollock against my account of modality. I define possibilism – i.e., the view that there is a property that does not entail existence, but is entailed by every property – and then give a more adequate definition of actualism based on its disagreement with possibilism. Pollock argues that the property of nonexistence is such that objects exemplify it in worlds in which they do not exist and based on this fact concludes that serious actualism is false. I give an argument that nonexistence is necessarily unexemplified and a separate argument for the conclusion that serious actualism is true. I conclude the essay by arguing that it does make a difference whether we accept existentialism or essentialism.

Keywords: actualism; essentialism; existence; existentialism; nonexistence; John Pollock; possibilism; property

Chapter.  7440 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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