Chapter

Two Concepts of Modality

Alvin Plantinga

in Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality

Published in print May 2003 | ISBN: 9780195103762
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833573 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195103769.003.0011
Two Concepts of Modality

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In the first part of this chapter, I sketch out three grades of modal realism. After developing modal realism, I examine David Lewis's modal theory. I argue that Lewis's theory satisfies none of the grades of modal realism, and that it is really a case of modal reductionism. In particular, I demonstrate that Counterpart Theory is a rejection of the view that objects have properties accidentally or essentially. Moreover, I claim that Lewis merely models things such as propositions, possible worlds or state of affairs, and that he, in fact, is an antirealist with regard to such entities.

Keywords: Counterpart Theory; essential; David Lewis; modal realism; modality; possible world; property; proposition; state of affairs

Chapter.  18517 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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