Chapter

The Threatened Downfall of Privacy: Judith Jarvis Thomson's “The Right to Privacy” and Skepticism About Privacy

Julie C. Inness

in Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation

Published in print June 1996 | ISBN: 9780195104608
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199868247 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195104609.003.0003
The Threatened Downfall of Privacy: Judith Jarvis Thomson's “The Right to Privacy” and Skepticism About Privacy

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Do we have any reason to believe that the claims assembled under the heading “privacy” are conceptually and morally coherent, or are they simply a jumble of disparate claims and their heterogeneous values, which should be abandoned for the sake of clarity? Privacy skeptics such as Judith Jarvis Thomson hold that the meaning and value accorded to privacy claims are irreducibly heterogeneous since privacy is merely a composite of unrelated elements, such as property rights and interests in self‐ownership. I argue against such privacy skepticism.

Keywords: privacy skepticism; property rights; Judith Jarvis Thomson

Chapter.  5738 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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