Chapter

A Priori Knowledge and Necessary Truth

Albert Casullo

in A Priori Justification

Published in print April 2003 | ISBN: 9780195115055
Published online May 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780199786190 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195115058.003.0008
 A Priori Knowledge and Necessary Truth

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The two questions have dominated traditional discussions of a priori knowledge: What is its relationship to necessary truth? What is its relationship to analytic truth? Answering them is not necessary to answer the two primary epistemological questions about a priori knowledge: What is it? Does it exist? This chapter argues that the prominence of questions about the relationship between the a priori and the necessary derives from two traditional views: the rationalist conception of a priori knowledge and Kant’s claim that necessity is a criterion of the a priori. Independent grounds for rejecting both are offered, and it is argued that the two primary epistemological questions about a priori knowledge can be answered without resolving the disputes over its relationship to necessary truth.

Keywords: a priori; knowledge; contingent; criterion; Kant; necessary; truth; necessity; rationalism

Chapter.  11738 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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