Chapter

Spinoza's Substance Monism

Michael Della Rocca

in Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes

Published in print February 2002 | ISBN: 9780195128154
Published online February 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780199786008 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019512815X.003.0002
 Spinoza's Substance Monism

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This essay supports a so-called identification-oriented interpretation of the argument for substance monism. It emphasizes the conceptual barrier between different attributes and the conceptual-independence condition in the definition of substance. It argues that certain features of Spinoza’s notion of attributes enable him to defend his argument for substance monism from a number of challenges: (1) the fact that, for Spinoza, each attribute of a substance, independently of the modes of the substance and independently of other attributes, is sufficient for conceiving of the substance; and (2) the fact that, for Spinoza, because of the conceptual independence of the attributes, no attribute of a substance can prevent that substance from having any other attribute.

Keywords: Spinoza; substance monism; identification-oriented; attributes

Chapter.  14787 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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