Chapter

Spinoza's Conatus Argument

Don Garrett

in Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes

Published in print February 2002 | ISBN: 9780195128154
Published online February 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780199786008 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019512815X.003.0008
 Spinoza's Conatus Argument

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This essay contends that Spinoza’s argument for the conatus doctrine does not commit any of the five fallacies of equivocation. The key to a better understanding of his argument lies in a Spinoza’s “theory of inherence” — that is, his theory of what it is to be “in” something. Spinoza’s conatus argument is a valid demonstration from Spinozistic premises about inherence, conception, causation, and related matters. These premises reflect his deep commitment to a rigorous Principle of Sufficient Reason, to a conception of things as causing their own properties through their essences, and to a closely-related conception of causation as identical with or parallel to logical consequence.

Keywords: Spinoza; conatus doctrine; conception; causation; inherence

Chapter.  17503 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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