Chapter

Epistemic and Moral Duty

Bruce Russell

in Knowledge, Truth, and Duty

Published in print March 2001 | ISBN: 9780195128925
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833764 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195128923.003.0003
Epistemic and Moral Duty

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Is in part about the relation between epistemic and moral justification. Begins with the distinction between subjective and objective moral justification, and then moves on to examine the difference between subjective and objective epistemic justification, which are, respectively, a function of freedom from epistemic blameworthiness and the adequacy of the subject's evidence. Main thesis is that knowledge requires the combination of both subjective and objective justification. This requirement allows the writer to rebut counterexamples suggested by Alvin Plantinga, according to whom justification is not necessary for knowledge.

Keywords: epistemic justification; knowledge; moral justification; objective justification; Plantinga; subjective justification

Chapter.  8514 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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