Chapter

Deciding to Believe

Carl Ginet

in Knowledge, Truth, and Duty

Published in print March 2001 | ISBN: 9780195128925
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833764 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195128923.003.0005
Deciding to Believe

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Defends the thesis that we are sometimes in the state of believing that p simply because we have decided to believe that p. To this end, employs, within the framework of a dispositional analysis of belief, the notion of counting on its being the case that p. Although, according to the writer, deciding what to believe is something we can do, it is something we do only rarely. In the last two sections, the writer discusses and rejects arguments for doxastic involuntarism by Williams and Alston.

Keywords: belief; deciding to act; deciding to believe; dispositions; reasons

Chapter.  8495 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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