Chapter

Epistemic Duty, Evidence, and Internality

Matthias Steup

in Knowledge, Truth, and Duty

Published in print March 2001 | ISBN: 9780195128925
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833764 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195128923.003.0009
Epistemic Duty, Evidence, and Internality

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Defends internalism against the objections in Essay 7. First, suggests that internalists can derive the accessibility constraint they need within the framework of evidentialism, according to which the justificational status of a belief is determined by one, and only one, kind of thing: the subject's evidential states. Second, in response to the problem of forgotten evidence, submits that such cases are not really counterexamples to internalism because, if described so as to succeed in posing a threat to internalism, they turn into Gettier cases. Third, responding to Goldman's internalism‐breeds‐skepticism objection, argues that Goldman burdens internalism with an assumption that its advocates are unlikely to accept: the assumption that having a justified belief requires having a correct belief, by virtue of which the belief is justified.

Keywords: evidence; evidentialism; externalism; forgotten evidence; Gettier cases; internalism; justification; reliabilism

Chapter.  8308 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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