Value Monism in Epistemology

Michael R. DePaul

in Knowledge, Truth, and Duty

Published in print March 2001 | ISBN: 9780195128925
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833764 | DOI:
Value Monism in Epistemology

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Value monism is the view that truth is the only intrinsic epistemic good, and justification is valuable only as a means to true belief. Argues against this view. The two propositions – (1) truth is the only intrinsic epistemic good, and (2) knowledge is better than mere true belief – cannot, according to the writer, both be true. Since (2) is obviously true, we must reject (1), and embrace value pluralism, which asserts that in addition to truth, there are further intrinsic goods, such as knowledge and justification.

Keywords: intrinsically good; justification; knowledge; monism; pluralism; truth

Chapter.  8258 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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