Preview
Addresses the question of how we can derive criteria of knowledge and justification. Identifies a range of propositions – commonsense propositions – which include epistemic propositions such as “I know that I have hands”, and suggests that they are suitable starting points for deriving the criteria we seek. To the objection that we cannot rely on such propositions without first showing how we know them, replies that this objection rests on an unacceptable theory of justification. In addition, explains how a commonsense philosopher would proceed in ethics, and discusses important arguments by Brandt, Hare, and Alston. Towards the end of the paper, examines the circularity problem that arises when we attempt to argue for the reliability of our faculties.
Keywords: common sense; criteria; epistemology; ethics; knowledge; reliability
Chapter. 8255 words.
Subjects: Metaphysics
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