Chapter

“Lately Things Don't Seem the Same” The Conceivability Argument

Joseph Levine

in Purple Haze

Published in print January 2001 | ISBN: 9780195132359
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833375 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195132351.003.0003

Series: Philosophy of Mind Series

 “Lately Things Don't Seem the Same” The Conceivability Argument

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The “conceivability argument” for dualism is presented and analyzed in depth. It is argued that in order to derive the possibility of zombies – creatures physically like us but without conscious experience – from their conceivability, certain unwarranted semantic and epistemic doctrines must be accepted. By introducing the idea of a nonascriptive mode of presentation, it is argued that a materialist can consistently allow the conceivability of zombies without admitting their metaphysical possibility.

Keywords: conceivability; dualism; metaphysical possibility; mode of presentation; zombie

Chapter.  15670 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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