Chapter

Frege on the Indefinability of Truth

Hans Sluga

in From Frege to Wittgenstein

Published in print January 2002 | ISBN: 9780195133264
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833580 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195133269.003.0004
Frege on the Indefinability of Truth

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One of Frege's most original insights is the claim that the concept of truth is simple and indefinable. This paper seeks to show how Frege reached that doctrine and what role it plays in his thinking. It then goes on to confront Frege's argumentation with Tarski's theory of truth and concludes that, far from being made obsolete by Tarski, these arguments remain of the greatest significance for understanding the philosophical problem of truth.

Keywords: fact; Frege; indefinability; state of affairs; Tarski; truth

Chapter.  12440 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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