Chapter

Logical Objects in Frege's Grundgesetze, Section 10

Marco Ruffino

in From Frege to Wittgenstein

Published in print January 2002 | ISBN: 9780195133264
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833580 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195133269.003.0006
Logical Objects in Frege's Grundgesetze, Section 10

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In this paper, I discuss three main issues concerning Frege's arguments in Grundgesetze, Section 10. (1) I argue against the view according to which Frege's procedure is insufficient to guarantee that names of extensions (or, more generally, names of value‐ranges) are really referential. (2) I discuss whether Frege meant to include other kinds of objects besides truth‐values and value‐ranges in the range of first‐order variables of his logical system. Finally, (3) I challenge the view according to which Frege's decision to make some stipulations concerning the identity of value‐ranges is incompatible with his alleged Platonism. Central to my approach is an elucidation of Frege's views on logical objects.

Keywords: extension; Frege; Grundgesetze; logic; logical objects; Platonism; reference; truth‐value; value‐range

Chapter.  14169 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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