Chapter

A Priori Warrant and Naturalistic Epistemology

Alvin I. Goldman

in Pathways to Knowledge

Published in print January 2002 | ISBN: 9780195138795
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833252 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195138791.003.0002
 A Priori Warrant and Naturalistic Epistemology

Show Summary Details

Preview

Some definitions of naturalistic epistemology exclude the possibility of a priori warrant, but a more plausible definition leaves room for it. The general approach to warrant favored here is two‐stage reliabilism, which is reformulated from earlier papers. The present proposal is that belief‐forming processes of a “ratiocinative” sort may be a priori warranters if they are reliable, free of perceptual experience, and part of one's basic cognitive architecture. Cognitive science is relevant to determining the possibility of a priori warranters because it can shed light on the availability of belief‐forming processes that might meet the foregoing requirements. A review of scientific findings on arithmetic cognition suggests that these requirements are indeed met.

Keywords: a priori; arithmetic cognition; cognitive science; naturalistic epistemology; reliabilism; warrant

Chapter.  12956 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.