Chapter

The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues

Alvin I. Goldman

in Pathways to Knowledge

Published in print January 2002 | ISBN: 9780195138795
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833252 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195138791.003.0003
 The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues

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A weak unity thesis about epistemic virtues holds that there is a core epistemic value – true belief – and that processes, traits, or actions are epistemic virtues by virtue of their relations with this core value. According to veritistic unitarianism, justification is a distinct epistemic value from truth but derives its value from that of true belief. This is explicit in reliabilism and implicit in many varieties of foundationalism and coherentism. Deontological evidentialism rejects veritistic consequentialism but has trouble accounting for evidence‐gathering virtues. The claim that “pragmatic” epistemic virtues are unrelated to truth is examined but found unpersuasive or readily accommodated with minor tweakings of the veritistic perspective.

Keywords: epistemic virtues; evidence; justification; pragmatic virtues; truth

Chapter.  9175 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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