Chapter

Philosophical Theory and Intuitional Evidence

Alvin I. Goldman

in Pathways to Knowledge

Published in print January 2002 | ISBN: 9780195138795
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833252 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195138791.003.0004
 Philosophical Theory and Intuitional Evidence

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How can intuitions be used to validate or invalidate a philosophical theory? An intuition about a case seems to be a basic evidential source for the truth of that intuition, i.e., for the truth of the claim that a particular example is or isn’t an instance of a philosophically interesting kind, concept, or predicate. A mental‐state type is a basic evidential source only if its tokens reliably indicate the truth of their contents. The best way to account for intuitions being a basic evidential source is to interpret their subject matter in psychologistic terms. Intuitions provide evidence about the contents of the intuiter's concept, where “concept” is understood as a psychological structure.

Keywords: concepts; evidence; intuitional evidence; intuitions; philosophical theory

Chapter.  10527 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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