Chapter

Heidegger's Response to Skepticism in Being and Time

Edward H. Minar

in Future Pasts

Published in print September 2001 | ISBN: 9780195139167
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833214 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019513916X.003.0009
 Heidegger's Response to Skepticism in Being and Time

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Section 43 of Heidegger’s Being and Time attempts to demonstrate that external world skepticism is self-defeating. Crucial to this effort is the claim that Dasein is Being-in-the-world, that we are always already involved with external things. Does starting with this phenomenological claim beg the question against the skeptic? No, because Heidegger is contesting the obviousness of the skeptic’s starting point, his depiction of our relation to the world. The essay shows that this strategy renders the skeptic’s demand for justification of Heidegger’s own description of Dasein as Being-in-the-world illegitimate and that charging Heidegger’s phenomenological response to skepticism with idealism is empty.

Keywords: Heidegger; being; skepticism; phenomenology; idealism; external world

Chapter.  11784 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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