Chapter

The Intentionality of the Basic Emotions

Craig Delancey

in Passionate Engines

Published in print January 2002 | ISBN: 9780195142716
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833153 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195142713.003.0005
 The Intentionality of the Basic Emotions

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The view that some emotions have a heterogeneous intentionality is defended. This is the view that different instances of these emotions, and perhaps some single instances, can have different complexities of contents. The most fundamental intentional aspect of basic emotions is found to be a minimal content necessary to direct actions, which is an invariant and persisting representation of a concrete object. More complex states include being a propositional attitude and having as an object, states of affairs. This has important implications for some views of intentionality, including being incompatible with views that deny the existence of nonpropositional representations.

Keywords: action; emotion; intentionality; propositional attitude; representation

Chapter.  7554 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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