Chapter

The Rationality of the Basic Emotions

Craig Delancey

in Passionate Engines

Published in print January 2002 | ISBN: 9780195142716
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833153 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195142713.003.0007
 The Rationality of the Basic Emotions

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This chapter defends an account of rationality that allows that instances of emotions, which are not propositional attitudes can be rational. A set of criteria that are broader than traditional criteria for rationality are introduced and defended. Some instances of emotions are shown to satisfy these criteria but not the traditional ones. An important and related point is a strong rejection of the standard belief–desire psychology that dominates both the philosophy of mind and of action, and disciplines such as decision theory and economics.

Keywords: belief–desire psychology; desire; emotion; propositional attitude; rationality

Chapter.  7558 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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