Chapter

Four Puzzles for Consciousness

Craig Delancey

in Passionate Engines

Published in print January 2002 | ISBN: 9780195142716
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833153 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195142713.003.0009
 Four Puzzles for Consciousness

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After a basic review of the contemporary debate about phenomenal consciousness, four puzzles about emotional experience are discussed. First, emotions appear to be essentially motivational states, making them poor candidates for arguments, akin to inverted spectra or zombie worlds. Second, emotions differ significantly in their character, whereas some phenomenal experiences do not. Third, emotions vary significantly in their intensity, another feature lacking in some phenomenal experiences. Fourth, representations do not appear to be the best explanation for the features of emotional experience.

Keywords: consciousness; emotion; inverted spectrum; phenomenal consciousness; representation; zombies

Chapter.  6997 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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