Chapter

The Computational Theory of Mind

Craig Delancey

in Passionate Engines

Published in print January 2002 | ISBN: 9780195142716
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833153 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195142713.003.0011
 The Computational Theory of Mind

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A strong form of the computational theory of mind is shown to be incompatible with our best understanding of emotions. Basic emotions – because they are bodily states that influence perception, the formation and recall of memories, and motivate action – act across levels of description and function that are essentially distinct in a strong form of the computational theory of mind. Some features of emotions are shown not to be well modeled as a symbolic computational process, but each must be accounted for on a computational theory of mind since they can affect the kinds of mental processes meant to be explained by that theory.

Keywords: computational theory of mind; emotion; functional levels; memory; perception

Chapter.  7333 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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