Craig Delancey

in Passionate Engines

Published in print January 2002 | ISBN: 9780195142716
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833153 | DOI:

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An enriched version of naturalism is defended. Naturalism is too often construed foremost as something that eliminates phenomena (eliminativism), and reduces our number of explanatory tools (reductionism). In fact, the sciences almost always increase the number of entities that we need to explain the phenomena. Philosophy, in comparison, has had vastly more reductive views (such as that mind and action can be explained in terms of two kinds of mental states, belief and desire). A richer naturalism also requires recognition of the role of biology in the understanding of the mind. The view that humans are radically distinct from other kinds of animals is an error characterizing failure to appreciate the biological nature of mind.

Keywords: belief; biology of mind; desire; eliminativism; naturalism; reductionism

Chapter.  5018 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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