Chapter

Stronger Reasons

Rüdiger Bittner

in Doing Things for Reasons

Published in print August 2001 | ISBN: 9780195143645
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833085 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195143647.003.0010
Stronger Reasons

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We compare the reasons one has in terms of strength, and the task of the present chapter is to explain what it is for one reason to be stronger than another. Raz offered a criterion, but that is shown to yield unsatisfactory results. The explanation proposed here is this: stronger reasons are states of affairs or events more important to the agent, the notion of importance deriving from Frankfurt's explication of what we care about. This proposal does not reduce the strength of reasons to the strength of the relevant desires. Contrary to Frankfurt's view, however, it does away with the difference between the order of reasons and the order of caring.

Keywords: action; caring; desire; Frankfurt; Raz; reasons

Chapter.  3537 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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