Chapter

Leibniz Against Molinism

Sean Greenberg

in Leibniz

Published in print January 2005 | ISBN: 9780195143744
Published online April 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780199835317 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195143744.003.0012
Leibniz Against Molinism

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This essay analyses Leibniz’s rejection of the doctrine of freedom promulgated by 16th-century Jesuit Luis de Molina. It argues that Leibniz’s case against the Molinist rests on their diverging conceptions of mind and will. In Leibniz’s account of freedom, the “will has no distinct functional role to play”. Rather than being an independent “self-determining power”, the will is a tendency or effort that depends on the mind’s representational states.

Keywords: Leibniz; freedom; will; indifference; Luis de Molina

Chapter.  9853 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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