Chapter

The Dean's Challenge

Peter Achinstein

in The Book of Evidence

Published in print October 2001 | ISBN: 9780195143898
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833023 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195143892.003.0001

Series: Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Science

 The Dean's Challenge

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The claim is made that standard philosophical accounts of evidence are and ought to be ignored by scientists for two reasons. First, they are too weak, allowing facts to count as evidence for hypotheses even if they provide no reason whatever for believing those hypotheses. Second, they mistakenly make the question of whether a fact is evidence for a hypothesis settleable entirely a priori, by calculation, whereas, in general, this is an empirical issue.

Keywords: a priori assumption; evidence; weakness assumption

Chapter.  5129 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Science

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