Chapter

Objective Epistemic Probability

Peter Achinstein

in The Book of Evidence

Published in print October 2001 | ISBN: 9780195143898
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833023 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195143892.003.0005

Series: Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Science

 Objective Epistemic Probability

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A new concept of probability ‐ objective epistemic probability ‐ is introduced and defended. It is epistemic because it is a measure of the degree of reasonableness of believing something; it is objective because it is independent of the beliefs of any person or group. The view is contrasted with several others, including the subjective Bayesian theory of probability, which is epistemic but not objective; with the propensity theory, which is objective but not epistemic; and with Carnap's view, which, like the view defended, is both epistemic and objective but, unlike it, is relativized to a potential epistemic situation.

Keywords: a priori probability; Bayes; Carnap; evidence; objective epistemic probability; propensity probability; reasonableness of belief; subjective Bayesian probability

Chapter.  9730 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Science

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