Chapter

Evidence, High Probability, and Belief

Peter Achinstein

in The Book of Evidence

Published in print October 2001 | ISBN: 9780195143898
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833023 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195143892.003.0006

Series: Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Science

 Evidence, High Probability, and Belief

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It is argued that evidence must supply a good reason for belief, and that the latter requires that the objective epistemic probability of the hypothesis on the evidence be greater than half. Conflicting views are examined and rejected, including a standard Bayesian view that associates probability with degrees of belief, the likelihood view of Richard Royall, Deborah Mayo's error‐statistical account, and a view of Mark Kaplan that divorces belief from probability.

Keywords: Bayes; Bayesian; belief; error‐statistical; evidence; Kaplan; likelihood; Mayo; probability; reason for belief; Royall

Chapter.  17445 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Science

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