Chapter

Two Paradoxes of Evidence: Ravens and Grue

Peter Achinstein

in The Book of Evidence

Published in print October 2001 | ISBN: 9780195143898
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199833023 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195143892.003.0009

Series: Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Science

 Two Paradoxes of Evidence: Ravens and Grue

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The concept of potential evidence defined in Ch. 8 is used to solve two powerful paradoxes of evidence: the ravens paradox, attributable to Carl G. Hempel, and the grue paradox, due to Nelson Goodman. The solutions offered are contrasted with those proposed by Hempel and Goodman themselves, and reasons are given for preferring the new solutions.

Keywords: Goodman; grue; grue paradox; Hempel; paradox of evidence; potential evidence; ravens paradox

Chapter.  13766 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Science

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