Wittgenstein on Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics

Juliet Floyd

in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic

Published in print March 2005 | ISBN: 9780195148770
Published online July 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780199835560 | DOI:

Series: Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy

Wittgenstein on Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics

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This article is a survey of Wittgenstein’s writings on logic and mathematics; an analytical bibliography of contemporary articles on rule-following, social constructivism, Wittgenstein, Gödel, and constructivism is appended. Various historical accounts of the nature of mathematical knowledge have glossed over the effects of linguistic expression on our understanding of its status and content. Initially Wittgenstein rejected Frege’s and Russell’s logicism, aiming to operationalize the notions of logical consequence, necessity, and sense. Vienna positivists took this to place analysis of meaning at the heart of philosophy, while Ramsey took extensionalism to result. Wittgenstein’s interest in rule-following emerged through his reactions to these attempted appropriations.

Keywords: Wittgenstein; logic; mathematics; rule-following; Gödel; Frege; Russell; consequence; Vienna positivists; Ramsey

Chapter.  25266 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic

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