Chapter

Self‐Control, Akrasia, and Emotion

Alfred R. Mele

in Autonomous Agents

Published in print November 2001 | ISBN: 9780195150438
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199869091 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195150430.003.0006
 Self‐Control, Akrasia, and Emotion

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Defends and explains the possibility of emotional analogs of akratic and self‐controlled actions. It is explained how people can avoidably acquire and continue to have feelings or emotions that they judge it best not to have and how they can exercise self‐control to avoid this. Our emotions are often products of such things as desires, habits of interpretation, learned patterns of emotional response, other emotions, and our physiological condition. The possibility of akratic feelings rests on the possibility that the evaluations that ground some better judgments about particular feelings neither fully fix nor exactly gauge the causal power of what produces those feelings. When there is a mismatch between the determinants of our feelings and our better judgments and when what we are feeling is subject to our control, akratic feelings are possible.

Keywords: action; akrasia; control; emotion; evaluation; feelings; judgment; self‐control

Chapter.  5869 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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