Introduces the second half of the book and links self‐control to autonomy. Determinism, compatibilism, and incompatibilism are defined, the experience of acting is explored, and three kinds of autonomy regarding proattitudes are distinguished: autonomously developing a proattitude over a stretch of time, autonomously possessing a proattitude during a stretch of time, and being autonomous regarding the influence of a proattitude on one's intentional behavior. It is argued that akratic action is compatible with determinism, that autonomy does not entail moral responsibility, that moral responsibility for an action does not entail that the action is autonomously performed, and that autonomously doing something does not entail that the agent was free to do something else instead.
Keywords: action; akrasia; autonomy; behavior; compatibilism; determinism; freedom; incompatibilism; moral responsibility; self‐control
Chapter. 7413 words.
Subjects: Philosophy of Mind
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