Logic, “Liberty”, and the Metaphysics of Responsibility

Paul Russell

in Freedom and Moral Sentiment

Published in print April 2002 | ISBN: 9780195152906
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199869343 | DOI:
 Logic, “Liberty”, and the Metaphysics of Responsibility

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This chapter presents a critical discussion of the classical interpretation of Hume's compatibilist strategy. It argues, in particular, that the classical interpretation fails to provide a satisfactory account of why Hume held that his specific views about the nature of “necessity” puts the free will controversy in a “new light.” This leads to the conclusion that there is something wrong with the classical interpretation and its heavy emphasis on Hume's conceptual distinction between two kinds of “liberty”.

Keywords: A. J. Ayer; compatibilism; conceptual analysis; Thomas Hobbes; indifference; libertarianism; liberty; necessity; Bertrand Russell; Moritz Schlick; spontaneity

Chapter.  7578 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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