Chapter

Freedom and Determinism

Timothy O'Connor

in Persons and Causes

Published in print November 2002 | ISBN: 9780195153743
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199867080 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019515374X.003.0001
 Freedom and Determinism

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The author considers the modal, or ”consequence,” argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. He diagnoses the defects in van Inwagen's original formulation of the Beta principle before recasting and defending a variant of the argument in terms of two simpler closure principles governing unavoidability. After disputing Frankfurt's case against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, he argues that even if one rejects an alternative possibilities condition on moral responsibility, it would be implausible to conclude that responsibility is consistent with determinism.

Keywords: ability; Beta principle; compatibilism; determinism; Frankfurt; free will; incompatibilism; Van Inwagen; moral responsibility; Principle of Alternative Possibilities

Chapter.  11339 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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