Chapter

Freedom and Indeterminism

Timothy O'Connor

in Persons and Causes

Published in print November 2002 | ISBN: 9780195153743
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199867080 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019515374X.003.0002
 Freedom and Indeterminism

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The author considers versions of two types of indeterminist accounts of free will: simple indeterminism, on which an agent's control over his own action is entirely noncausal, and causal indeterminism, on which control is exercised through the indeterministic causation of one's action by one's reasons. He argues that neither approach gives a plausible account of the kind of freedom that is required for moral responsibility. The work of Ginet, Nozick, McCall, and Kane are discussed.

Keywords: causal indeterminism; control; effort of will; Ginet; indeterminism; Kane; McCall; Nozick; probability; reasons; simple indeterminism; volition

Chapter.  10852 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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